About That Signals Chat
This week, the Atlantic Magazine published the stunning report that the Trump national security team (including the National Security Advisor, Secretaries of Defense and State, the CIA Director and the Director of National Intelligence) had discussed a pending attack on Houthis in Yemen over a third party testing platform known as Signal. In response, the Trump Administration doubled down in its claims that no classified information was disclosed. In response, the Atlantic published the entire text chain.
Here are my thoughts after reviewing the Signals chat.
First, even if the information had been unclassified, it was legally problematic to have this discussion on a non-governmental network. It was wrong for Hilary Clinton to use a private email service for official business, and it was wrong for the Trump Administration officials to use Signal. The Federal Records Act requires that documents about federal activities (which include electronic records) must be saved. For White House officials such as Mike Waltz and Stephen Miller, the requirements are even more stringent requirements due to the Presidential Records Act of 1978. When I worked in the Executive Office of the President under President Clinton, a copy of every email I sent was automatically copied. It may be that the Administration has a system to keep records of Signals chats, but they have yet to make this claim.
Moreover, even if the information was not classified, it was certainly highly sensitive and could be damaging should our adversaries get access. The chat, after all, concerned the decision to take military action at a particular time, and the details of the pending attack was ultimately set out in some detail by the Secretary of Defense. As the Atlantic notes:
At 11:44 a.m. eastern time, Hegseth posted in the chat, in all caps, “TEAM UPDATE:”
The text beneath this began, “TIME NOW (1144et): Weather is FAVORABLE. Just CONFIRMED w/CENTCOM we are a GO for mission launch.” Centcom, or Central Command, is the military’s combatant command for the Middle East. The Hegseth text continues:
“1215et: F-18s LAUNCH (1st strike package)”
“1345: ‘Trigger Based’ F-18 1st Strike Window Starts (Target Terrorist is @ his Known Location so SHOULD BE ON TIME – also, Strike Drones Launch (MQ-9s)”
The Hegseth text then continued:
“1410: More F-18s LAUNCH (2nd strike package)”
“1415: Strike Drones on Target (THIS IS WHEN THE FIRST BOMBS WILL DEFINITELY DROP, pending earlier ‘Trigger Based’ targets)”
“1536 F-18 2nd Strike Starts – also, first sea-based Tomahawks launched.”
“MORE TO FOLLOW (per timeline)”
“We are currently clean on OPSEC”—that is, operational security.
“Godspeed to our Warriors.”
While Signal protects communications with end-to-end encryption, its messages are vulnerable once on a device. It is not approved for this type of sensitive discussion. Smartphones are very vulnerable to hacking. It is for this reason that classified discussions are supposed to be help in secure locations (generally SCIFS) in which phones are not allowed. One of the participants was in Moscow at the time, which makes this especially concerning.
Second, the claim that information about the timing, location, target and weapons systems related to an eminent military strike is simply not credible. If it was not classified, it should have been. If the Houthis had received this information before the attack, they could have taken defensive actions that could have protected the targets and endangered the lives of the Navy pilots. The potential damage to national security here is much higher that that deemed sufficient for a Top Secret classification. If the information was not classified (perhaps for the convenience of the participants ) it should have been.